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On October 31, 1979, the Department of Commerce published
the final draft of the Model Uniform Product Liability Act.' The
Act is the culmination of a process begun by President Ford in 1976
to clarify and stabilize product liability law and, thereby, stabilize
recoveries and insurance premiums.2 During its formation testi-
mony was received from major interest groups, each of which
hoped the Act would provide a solution to its particular product
liability problems. Consumers saw gains being eroded away by
legislation in many states which limited a manufacturer's liability.
Manufacturers saw themselves as becoming insurers of their prod-
ucts, yet increasingly being unable to afford and, in some in-
stances, obtain liability insurance. Insurers claimed that their
liability had become impossible to predict because of the open-
ended nature of product liability claims, and the increase in the
frequency of claims and amount of awards. Consequently, they
claimed that there was no way to stop the spiraling premiums. 3
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indi-
ana.
1. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABLxrY ACT [hereinafter cited as UPLA], re-
printed in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
2. A Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability was established in
April, 1976, by the Economic Policy Board of the White House. On January 4,
1977, its report, THE FEDERAL INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABIL-
rrY, BRIEFING REPORT (1977) was released [hereinafter cited as BRIEFING RE-
PORT]. This was edited and published under the Carter administration as
separate studies: UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK
FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY (1977)
[hereinafter cited as LEGAL STUDY]; UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, IN-
TERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDUS-
TRY STUDY (1977) [hereinafter cited as INDUSTRY STUDY]; UNITED STATES
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL
REPORT OF THE INSURANCE STUDY (1977) [hereinafter cited as INSURANCE
STUDY].
3. See, e.g., S. 403, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in Product Liability
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Like all products of compromise, the Act is likely to disappoint
each group. It introduces and strengthens defenses and increases
claimant's burden of proof; it does away with many of the gains
manufacturers had obtained through legislative change while po-
tentially increasing manufacturer liability; and it is ineffectual in
solving the open-endedness and spiraling awards problems. The
Act changes common law little, and many of the changes it does
make are so hedged with compromise that they are at best ineffec-
tual. In addition, inconsistencies in the burdens of proof are likely
to cause much confusion if the UPLA is adopted. Although the Act
may prove useful as a standard of reference for courts and legisla-
tures considering product liability change,4 its adoption is unlikely
to lead to the achievement of its stated goals of reducing confusion
and stabilizing recoveries and insurance premiums.5
II. THE PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIM
The Act preempts the common law theories of action for prod-
uct liability 6-strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and
misrepresentation-and replaces them with the single product lia-
bility claim.7 While this move may eliminate some confusion 8 and
certain procedural advantages engendered by a choice of theories, 9
it actually changes little because these common law theories are
Insurance Hearings on S. 403 Before the Sub-Comm.for Consumers of the Sen-
ate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1977); BRIEFING REPORT, supra note 2; Note, When the Product Ticks: Prod-
ucts Liability and Statutes of Limitation, 11 IND. L REV. 693, 695-99 (1978).
4. Birnbaum, Weighing the Model Uniform Act's Proposed Evidentiary Changes,
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 24, 1980, at 25.
5. See UPLA Preamble, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,716.
6. The Act does not cover economic loss; therefore, it does not preempt the Uni-
form Commerical Code or other commercial law regarding claims for direct
or consequential economic damages. UPLA § 103(A), reprinted in 44 Fed.
Reg. at 62,720.
7. Id.
8. See Jorae v. Clinton Crop Serv., 465 F. Supp. 952, 954-55 (1979). Jury instruc-
tions are a special problem when several theories are used. Wade, On Prod-
uct "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L REv. 551, 577 (1980).
9. Statutes of limitations are good examples. Some courts have held that the
Uniform Commercial Code's four-year statute of limitations which runs from
the date of delivery, U.C.C. § 2-725 (1976), applies to personal injuries cases
based on warranty. Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 M11. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550
(1974); Colvin v. FMC Corp., 43 Or. App. 709, 604 P.2d 157 (1979). Other courts
have held that the statutory limitation for personal injury actions based in
tort is applicable. Brown v. Merrow Mach. Co., 411 F. Supp. 1162 (D. Conn.
1976); Becker v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 52 Cal. App. 3d 794, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 326 (1975). Similarly, some courts have held that a suit in warranty re-
quires notification under U.C.C. § 2-607(3) (a) (1976). Bennett v. United Auto
Parts, Inc., 294 Ala. 300, 315 So. 2d 579 (1975); San Antonio v. Warwick Club
Ginger Ale Co., 104 R.L 700, 248 A.2d 778 (1968). Contra, Goldstein v. G.D.
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reintroduced into the Act under various sections. A manufacturer
will be held strictly liable for mismanufactured products, but negli-
gence is applied to defects in design and warnings.' 0 Express war-
ranties are specifically recognized, and exempted from pro-
manufacturer sections of the Act, such as section 106 which denies
liability for an unavoidably dangerous aspect of a product, and sec-
tion 110 which creates the presumption that after ten years a prod-
uct is being used beyond its useful safe life." Intentional
misrepresentations are similarly recognized and exempted. 12 Be-
cause a product "may be unreasonably unsafe in more than one
way," many product liability claims will still be litigated under
more than one theory.' 3 Thus, the hoped for simplification may be
lost as new litigation determines the implications of this legislative
reshuffling.
The retention of these theories is illustrative of the Act's tradi-
tional approach to most product liability problems. The drafters,
in adopting a tort compensation approach to product liability,
chose to follow the state of product liability law in virtually every
jurisdiction. 14 Fault, as manifested by an "unreasonably unsafe"
defective product, not the mere act of manufacturing a product
which injures, is the Act's basis for recovery.'5 However, a product
which deviates from the manufacturer's self-established standards
is by definition unreasonably unsafe.' 6 Therefore, the manufac-
turer is strictly liable for mismanufactured products and products
which do not meet its express warranty. However, because no sin-
gle standard was considered appropriate for manufacturers'
Searle & Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 344, 378 N.E.2d 1083 (1978); Fericks v. General
Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 363 A.2d 460 (1976).
10. UPLA § 104(A), (C), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62721.
11. UPLA §§ 104(D), 105(B), 106(B) (3), 110(B) (2) (a), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at
62,721, 62,726, 62,727, 62,733.
12. UPLA §§ 110(B) (2) (b), 120(B) (4), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,733, 62,748.
13. UPLA §§ 104, Analysis, 110(B) (2) (b), 120(B) (4), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at
62,722, 62,733, 62,748. Since failure to adequately warn is often a fallback the-
ory if defect is difficult to prove, the likelihood of a majority of suits including
at least two theories is considerable. See Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of
the Uniform Product Liability Law-A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV.
221, 234 (1979).
14. But see Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Maryland, 48 U.S.L.W. 2839 (Del. S. Ct.
1980), where the Delaware Supreme Court refused to adopt strict liability in
sales cases.
15. UPLA § 104, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721. With the possible exception of
Pennsylvania, no state imposes traditional strict or absolute liability on a
manufacturer. In Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020
(1978), the court stated that the manufacturer of a product is the guarantor of
its safety. Id. at 559 n.12, 391 A.2d at 1027 n.12. However, the court also denied
that it was imposing an insurer's liability. Id. at 553, 391 A.2d at 1024.
16. UPLA § 104(A), (D), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721.
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choices regarding designs and warnings, these are judged by a
risk-benefit analysis.'7 This division of defects into strict liability
and risk-benefit types again closely tracks the common law.
Following the lead of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec-
tion 402A18 and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,19 most
states have been willing to impose strict liability for mismanufac-
tured products. Mismanufactured products easily meet the Green-
man and Section 402A requirement of being unreasonably
dangerous and falling below consumer expectations. In producing
a product, the manufacturer establishes a minimum standard for
that product, and consumers, at a minimum, expect one product to
perform as safely as others that came off the same assembly line.
The standard by which to judge the mismanufactured product is
readily available and easily determined.
The same is true of an express warranty. If a manufacturer
makes claims about its product, the consumer justifiably expects
the product to meet these claims. The standard by which the prod-
uct is to be judged is easily determined by reference to those
claims. The common law has traditionally held manufacturers
strictly liable for products which deviate from express claims that
shape consumer expectations, whether suit is brought under war-
ranty or misrepresentation. 20
However, courts have been reluctant to apply as strict a liability
to design and warning cases because, unlike manufacturing defect
cases, the central question is the standard by which to judge
whether the product is defective. No absolute standard has been
acceptable to the courts because they do not want to make manu-
facturers insurers of all their products. A finding of defect based
on design or warning choices impugns the entire line, not just the
deviating product. Almost any product can be made safer but most
17. Id. § 104(B), (C), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721.
In order to determine that the product was unreasonably unsafe
in design, the trier of fact must find that, at the time of manufacture,
the likelihood that the product would cause the claimant's harm or
similar harms, and the seriousness of those harms outweighed the
burden on the manufacturer to design a productthat would have pre-
vented those harms, and the adverse effect that alternative design
would have on the usefulness of the product.
Id. § 104(B) (1), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
19. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (held that a remote pur-
chaser could sue in strict liability the manufacturer of a defective lathe which
caused the purchaser personal injury).
20. See, e.g., Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 534 P.2d 377, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681
(1975); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965). See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 652 (4th ed. 1971).
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courts have been unwilling to require manufacturers to do so if the
resulting safer product would be inutile or unsalable, or would lead
to financial ruin.21 Therefore, a "safest possible" standard has
been widely rejected, and most courts have required a claimant to
prove something more than that a safer product was possible. This
"something more" is usually phrased in terms of feasibility. 22
An industry-established standard also has been rejected by
most courts, but for the opposite reason-industry is too likely to
choose a design that is not safe enough. Apparently, the fear is
that, unlike professionals such as doctors and lawyers whose deci-
sions are judged by group-established standards, manufacturers
work for profit instead of the theoretical good of humanity; there-
fore, their decisions would not give safety its proper perspective.23
Having rejected these two relatively easily determined and
straight forward standards, most courts have fallen back on the
Greenman and Restatement formulas. 24 However, in their search
21. See, e.g., Weakley v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 515 F.2d 1260, 1267-68 (5th Cir.
1975) ("The defendant is not obliged to design the safest possible product, or
one as safe as others make or a safer product than the one he has designed,
so long as the design he has adopted is reasonably safe."); Dreisonstok v.
Volkswagenwerk, A. G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974) (van couldn't be made
more crashworthy and retain features that made it useful); Thibault v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978) (could risk be reduced with-
out significant impact on product effectiveness and manufacturing costs);
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974) (unnecessary
to make safer if would be priced out of the market, or inutile).
22. See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322, rehearing
denied with opinion, 282 Or. 411, 569 P.2d 1287 (1978); Henderson v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1975); II LEGAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 36. The
California Supreme Court in Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430 n.10,
573 P.2d 443, 455 n.10, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 n.10 (1978), left open the possibil-
ity of strict liability for products for which no safer design is feasible.
23. Wade, supra note 8, at 568-69; O'Donnell, Des-ign Litigation and the State of
the Art: Terminology, Practice and Reform, 11 AKRON L REv. 627, 631 (1978).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965) provides:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a prod-
uct, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
Comment i explains "unreasonably dangerous" to be dangerous "to the
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as
to its characteristic." Id., Comment i.
The Greenman court stated that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort
when an article he placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human
being." Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897,
[Vol. 60:50
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for an appropriate standard, courts have differed in their interpre-
tations of these basic formulas. Some courts have focused more
heavily on the negligence heritage of strict liability and have ap-
plied a straightforward risk-benefit 25 or reasonably prudent manu-
facturer test.26 The reasonably prudent manufacturer test is a
risk-benefit analysis which uses the manufacturer as the point of
reference. It asks whether a prudent manufacturer would have
marketed the product, knowing of the risks involved in its use.27
The factor which theoretically makes these strict liability and not
negligence tests is that knowledge of the risk is imputed to the
manufacturer. 28
A recent decision by the Texas Supr.eme Court, Turner v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp.,29 is a leading example of a straight forward risk-
benefit approach. Turner was a crashworthiness case in which the
defect that caused plaintiffs injuries did not cause the accident.
The court determined that strict liability was an appropriate stan-
dard to apply to crashworthiness design decisions, and that defect
was to be determined by balancing the utility of the product
against the risk involved in its use. In using this risk-benefit ap-
proach the court rejected a reasonable manufacturer test or a con-
sumer expectations test.3 0 It rejected the consumer expectation
test because it doubted that "jurors would know what ordinary
consumers would expect in the consumption or use of a product, or
that jurors would or could apply any standard or test outside their
own experiences and expectations."'1 The "alternative" prudent
manufacturer test was rejected because it provided no better stan-
dard.32
900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963). Defect is defined as "a defect in design and
manufacture of which the plaintiff was not aware that made [the product]
unsafe for its intended use." Id. at 64, 337 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
25. Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976); Moning v. Alfono, 400
Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H.
802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978).
26. See, e.g., Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 402 A.2d 140
(1979); Newman v. Utility Trailer & Equip. Co., 278 Or. 395,564 P.2d 674 (1977);
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 581, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
27. "A dangerously defective article would be one which a reasonable person
would not put into the stream of commerce if he had knowledge of its harmfuI
character. The test, therefore, is whether the seller would be negligent if he
sold the article knowing of the risk involved." Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co.,
269 Or. 485, 492, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974) (emphasis in the original).
28. Newman v. Utility Trailer & Equip. Co., 278 Or. 395, 564 P.2d 674 (1977); Wade,
On the Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 834 (1973).
29. 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
30. Id. at 850-51.
31. Id. at 851 (citations omitted).
32. "The stated reason for the alternative test of the prudent manufacturer does
not justify its continued use." Id.
19811
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The other main approach followed by the courts, the consumer
expectations test, draws more heavily on the implied warranty
background of strict liability. This test uses the consumer as the
point of reference and asks whether the product is defective be-
cause it is more dangerous than the reasonable consumer would
expect.33 Little can be said with assurance about consumer expec-
tations concerning design of a product except that most consumers
assume that a manufacturer will put a reasonably safely designed
product on the market.34 Consequently, this test has been more
difficult for the courts to define. There has been disagreement on
whether the test should be objective 35 or subjective, 36 on whether
patent dangers will excuse a manufacturer,3 7 and on the amount of
subjectivity tolerable in expectations regarding complicated prod-
33. See, e.g., Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975);
Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978); Lamon v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 91 Wash. 2d 348, 588 P.2d 1346 (1979). The warranty back-
ground of the consumer expectations test has been widely recognized.
Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430-31, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 236 (1978); Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L.
REv. 339, 348 (1974); Schwartz, Foreward: Understanding Products Liability,
67 CALmj. L. REV. 435, 438-39 (1979). The wide acceptance of the consumer
expectations test is partially due to its incorporation into the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, Comment i (1965): "The article sold must be dan-
gerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordi-
nary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to
the community as to its characteristics."
34. See, e.g., Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration
of Strict Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REv. 803, 832 (1976);
Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B. A Decade of Litiga-
tion, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1185, 1205 (1976); Schwartz, supra note 33, at 478.
35. See, e.g., Alle'n v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978); Vincer
v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230
N.W.2d 794 (1975); II LEGAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 30-31.
36. See, e.g., Williams v. Brasea, Inc., 497 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 906 (1975) (seaman have common knowledge that lines on shrimp boats
frequently tangle); Hunt v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 147 Ga. App. 44, 248
S.E.2d 15 (1978) (motorcyclist with many years of experience was aware of
danger of motorcycle without a crash bar); Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C.
453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978) (because decedent was an experienced boater, he
must have known of the risks resulting from manufacturer's failure to install
a power kill switch).
37. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071 (4th Cir. 1974) (a
design is not unreasonably dangerous because the risk is one which anyone
immediately would recognize and avoid); Hunt v. Harley Davidson Motor Co.,
147 Ga. App. 44, 248 S.E.2d 15 (1978) (there is no duty to warn of a product-
connected danger which is obvious or generally known); Stenberg v. Beatrice
Foods Co., 176 Mont. 123, 576 P.2d 725 (1978) (patent danger should not, as a
matter of policy, excuse manufacturer); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376,
384 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976) (a manufacturer should not escape lia-
bility simply because the defect is obvious).
[Vol. 60:50
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ucts.38 Regardless of these differences, most courts have employed
some balancing of factors, as has been the case in the reasonable
manufacturer and risk-benefit approaches. 3 9
Some courts, not happy with either approach, have combined
the two.40 In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,41 the California Court
fashioned a unique approach by using consumer expectations and
a risk-utility analysis as a two-pronged test to determine liability.
If the plaintiff fails to meet the threshold ordinary consumer ex-
pectations test, she can still prevail if the defendant manufacturer
is unable to show that the benefits of the design outweigh the risks
inherent in such design. This test was an attempt to eliminate neg-
ligence principles in strict liability analysis, with a shift of the bur-
den of proof to the manufacturer supposedly erasing all vestiges of
it. 42 While this test has caused much comment,43 it has drawn few
followers.44
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, the UPLA's adop-
tion of a risk-benefit approach is consistent with the standard be-
ing used by a large number of jurisdictions. The abandonment of
the consumer as the point of reference45 would be a nominal
change for jurisdictions that use the consumer expectations test;
however, many of these jurisdictions utilize a risk-benefit analysis
anyway. For those that don't use a risk-benefit analysis, the adop-
tion of the Act's approach would have the advantage of clearing up
much of the confusion engendered by a consumer expectations
test, especially in cases involving complicated products about
38. UPLA § 104(B), Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,724. Birnbaum, Un-
masking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence Ito Warranty] to Strict
Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 614 (1980).
39. See, e.g., Casrell v. Altec Indus. Inc., 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala. 1976); Seattle-First
Nat'l Bank v. Talbert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975); H LEGAL STUDY,
supra note 2, at 30.
40. See, e.g., Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1973); Suter v.
San Angelo Foundry Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
41. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
42. Id. at 433, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238. Despite this shift in the burden
of proof and the insistence by the court that the focus is on the product, this
test still leaves the trier of fact balancing the options of the manufacturer to
determine if the choices made were reasonable.
43. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 38, at 602-10; Schwartz, supra note 33, pas-
sim.; 28 DRAKE L. REV. 493 (1978-79).
44. Only Alaska has expressly adopted this test. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 882, 885, (Alaska 1979). The Supreme Court of Oregon ex-
pressly declined to follow it. Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 66, 577
P.2d 1322, 1327, rehearing denied with opinion, 282 Or. 411, 579 P.2d 1287
(1978). In Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844,851 (Tex. 1979), the
Texas Supreme Court rejected a similar bifurcated test of ordinary consumer
expectations and reasonably prudent manufacturer.
45. UPLA § 104, Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,724.
1981]
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which the consumer can have few realistic expectations. 46 Per-
haps one of the most useful things the Act will do is serve as a
point of authority for jurisdictions which are casting about for a
workable design defect standard.
However, the UPLA does not speak to the issue which most
courts have emphasized in separating the risk-benefit negligence
test from the strict liability test-the imputation of knowledge to
the manufacturer.47 The drafters do say that "[i] n light of the fact
that the judgment is the equivalent of holding that the whole prod-
uct line is defective, it is important that traditional tort law princi-
ples be followed and that the claimant retain the burden of
proof."48 Since negligence is the standard, claimants will have to
show that the reasonable manufacturer knew or should have
known of the risks inherent in the design as well as the available
alternatives. This change from product liability law in the many
jurisdictions that impute knowledge to the manufacturer 49 unnec-
essarily penalizes the claimant in that the risk-benefit standard
could have been utilized, and clarity achieved, without shifting the
burden back to the claimant. Nevertheless, the practical effect of
this shift may not be very great in most jurisdicitons because even
under a negligence standard the manufacturer is expected to be an
expert in its field and be aware of current developments. 50 How-
ever, the Act's shift in the burden of proof would work a major
change in those states in which the manufacturer is held liable for
risks and improvements unknowable at the time of manufacture.
The view that manufacturers should be liable for knowledge
and improvements at the time of trial, not manufacture, has been
urged by Dean Keeton and other legal scholars as the way to dis-
tinguish negligence from strict liability.5 ' It has been adopted by a
small but growing number of courts.5 2 This growing adoption
greatly concerned manufacturers, who responded by getting "state
of the art" legislation adopted in several states.5 3 Generally this
46. Montgomery & Owen, supra note 34, at 823; Wade, supra note 28, at 829.
47. See note 28 & accompanying text supra. But see Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co.,
79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980) (plaintiff must show defendant knew or
should have known of dangers in strict liability failure to warn suit).
48. UPLA § 104, Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,724.
49. See Birnbaum, supra note 38, at 647.
50. 11 LEGAL STUDy, supra note 2, at 27; Phillips, A Synopsis of the Developing
Law of Products Liability, 28 DRAxE L. REV. 317, 346 (1978-79).
51. Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 38
(1973).
52. See, e.g., Stanfield v. Medalist Indus., Inc., 34 Ill. App. 3d 635, 340 N.E.2d 276
(1975); Bailey v. Boatland of Houston, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979).
53. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-681(6) (Supp. 1979); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-403(1) (a) (Supp. 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-4(4) (Burns Supp.
[Vol. 60:50
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legislation bars consideration of post-manufacture knowledge of
improvements in assessing the defectiveness of the product. If the
safety improvement which might have prevented the accident was
not in the "state of the art" at the time the product was made, the
manufacturer will not be liable.
The Act implicitly rejects the Keeton approach by adopting a
traditional negligence standard;54 it also specifically embraces the
"state of the art" defense by barring evidence of post-manufacture
changes including changes in technological feasibility.55 Thus, the
plaintiff must show that at the time of manufacture the probability
and seriousness of injury outweighed the technical, functional and
economic difficulties involved in making the product safer.
Failure to adequately warn or instruct is judged by the same
negligence at time-of-manufacture standard under the UPLA.56 In
many ways, warning and instruction defects are simply a variation
of the duty to design safely,57 and the common law has treated
them in a manner similar to its treatment of design defects.58
However, because foreseeability plays a more important role in
failure to warn cases,59 the Act's abandonment of imputation of
knowledge to the manufacturer will have a greater impact than it
would in design cases.60 On the other hand, the adoption of the
time-of-manufacture standard will change little. Because foresee-
1980); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.310(2) (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3705
(Supp. 1979).
54. The reasonable manufacturer would not know of risks which were unknow-
able at the time of manufacture.
55. UPLA § 107(A), (D), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,728. Section 107(A) states:
Evidence of changes in (1) a product's design, (2) warnings or in-
structions concerning the product, (3) technological feasibility, (4)
"state of the art", or (5) the custom of the product seller's industry or
business, occurring after the product was manufactured, is not ad-
missible for the purpose of proving that the product was defective in
design under Subsection 104(B) or that a warning of instruction
should have accompanied the product at the time of manufacture
under Subsection 104(C).
Id. § 107(A), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,728. Subsection (D) defines "prac-
tical technological feasibility" as "the technological, mechanical, and scien-
tific knowledge relating to product safety that was reasonably feasible for
use, in light of economic practicality, at the time of manufacture .... Id.
§ 107(D).
56. Id. §§ 104(C), 107(A), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721, 62,728.
57. Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Pehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in
Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L.
REV. 495, 501-05 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Twerski]; I1 LEGAL STUDY, supra
note 2, at 60.
58. See, e.g., UPLA § 104, Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,723.
59. The utility of the product is not considered in warning cases; instead, the fo-
cus is on the seriousness of the danger and its foreseeability.
60. II LEGAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 67.
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ability plays such an important role in warning cases, courts have
been even more reluctant there than in design defect cases to hold
manufacturers liable for risks which were unknowable at the time
of manufacture. 61 Thus, the Act's bar of post-manufacture evi-
dence concerning warnings is consistent with the common law as
well as recent legislative changes.
This time-of-manufacture standard does not shield manufactur-
ers who unreasonably fail to warn about dangers discovered after
the product was manufactured. Warnings and instructions given
at the time of manufacture are judged by knowledge existing at
that time. However, knowledge about a product-connected danger
acquired after production raises an obligation on the part of the
manufacturer to make reasonable efforts to warn product owners
of those dangers. 62 The common law has long recognized this
duty.63 Furthermore, several recent decisions have included very
large punitive damage awards for failing to warn after acquiring
knowledge of a danger. Most of these cases, however, have in-
volved a manufacturer's efforts to hide information concerning
known dangers and to continue to market the product.64 Clearly
such actions indicate much more culpability than a mere failure to
warn.
Because courts consider warnings and instructions relatively
easy and inexpensive to give,65 and because plaintiffs increasingly
use failure to warn as a back-up theory of liability,66 warnings are
potentially one of the most explosive issues in product liability
law. This explosiveness could be enhanced by the Act's bar of the
imputation of knowledge and its adoption of the time-of-manufac-
ture standard. If plaintiff's case is weak regarding manufacturer
knowledge or safety improvement feasibility in either design or
warning situations, a back-up claim might be predicated on a post-
manufacture failure to warn. For purposes of this claim, evidence
of post-manufacture change would be probative and, assumedly,
61. Id. at 68-69.
62. UIPLA § 104(C) (6), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721.
63. See, e.g., Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970); Com-
stock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959).
64. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973) (defendant
promoted new use for chloroquine phosphate without warnings that pro-
longed use would cause retinopathy); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251
Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967) (defendant falsified and concealed
test results indicating dangerousness of MER 29 while heavily promoting it
and representing it as safe).
65. See, e.g., West v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 197 N.W.2d 202, 211-12 (Iowa
1972); Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 543-44, 332 A.2d 11, 15 (1975); Hamil-
ton v. Morton Coach Indus. Inc., 569 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978);
Twerski, supra note 57, at 513.
66. Phillips, supra note 50, at 352.
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admissible. 67 Thus, because it provides an alternative theory of re-
covery by which the state of the art evidence bar may be avoided,
the post-manufacture duty to warn will be used increasingly in
product liability suits.
II. DEFENSES
Defenses under the UPLA are treated in a manner consistent
with the balancing approach to liability adopted for design and
warning defect decisions, and, with the exception of the useful safe
life defense, 68 follow recent trends in tort law. Comparative fault is
used to balance a claimant's conduct against the product's defect
in determining responsibility for an injury.69 In addition, partial
defenses are created for the manufacturer by the use of rebuttable
presumptions. 70
Strict product liability has never been strict in the traditional
sense in that defenses have long been recognized.7 1 For example
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes as-
sumption of the risk as a defense to strict liability,7 2 and most ju-
risdictions which look to the Restatement as the source of strict
liability have accepted this defense. One of the main differences
among jurisdictions concerning the assumption of the risk defense
is whether actual knowledge of the risk is required or whether it
can be inferred from facts like the obviousness of the danger.7 3
Closely analogous to this is the recognition of the patent danger
rule which has limited a manufacturer's liability in a majority of
jurisdictions.74 The patent danger rule is not an affirmative de-
67. "If the court finds that the probative value of such evidence substantially out-
weighs its prejudicial effect ... [it] may be admitted for other relevant pur-
poses. . . ." UPLA § 107(A), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,728.
68. See notes 141-47 & accompanying text infra.
69. UPLA §§ 111, 112, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,734-36. See notes 87-98 & ac-
companying text infra.
70. UPLA §§ 108, 110 to 112, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,730, 62,732-36. See
notes 109-11 & accompanying text infra.
71. II LEGAL STuDy, supra note 2, at 90.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965).
73. Compare Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1976)
(actual knowledge required) and Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152
(Utah 1979) (actual knowledge required) with Downey v. Moore's Time-Sav-
ing Equip., Inc., 432 F.2d 1088 (7th Cir. 1970) (defendant should have known of
danger) and Bereman v. Burdolski, 204 Kan. 162, 460 P.2d 567 (1969) (defend-
ant should have known of danger).
74. See, e.g., Mather v. Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 23 Ariz. 409, 533 P.2d 717 (1975);
Hensely v. Muskin Corp., 65 Mich. App. 662, 238 N.W.2d 362 (1976); Kimble v.
Waste Systems Int'l, Inc., 23 Wash. App. 331, 595 P.2d 569 (1979).
The UPLA adopts this position: "A manufacturer shall not be liable for its
failure to warn or instruct about dangers that are obvious .... " UPLA
§ 104(C) (4), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721.
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fense. Instead, it relieves the manufacturer of a duty to guard
against or warn of dangers which are open and obvious. It has
been most widely used by courts who employ a consumer expecta-
tions test. These courts have reasoned that a reasonable consumer
will recognize and appreciate dangers which were open and obvi-
ous; therefore, the manufacturer should not have to take additional
precautions. 75 However, an increasing number of courts are refus-
ing to recognize patent danger as an absolute bar, and are instead
considering it as just one of several factors to consider in determin-
ing liability.76
Misuse and product alteration, the proof of which are the other
two most common ways a manufacturer can avoid strict liability,
also are not generally considered to be affirmative defenses. The
Restatement recognizes misuse as a way to prove that the product
was not defective, but that it was the claimant's misuse of a nonde-
fective product which caused the injuries.77 Thus, it is used to re-
but defect and causation. 78 Product alteration is treated in a
similar manner. A defendant can avoid liability by showing that it
was the alteration, not a defect in the product, which caused claim-
ant's injuries. 79 However, misuse and alteration are not absolute
bars to liability. If the misuse or alteration was foreseeable, most
courts will hold that the manufacturer had a duty to take precau-
tions.8 0 Furthermore, some courts have allowed recovery where
misuse of a defective product led to claimant's injuries.81 Misuse
and product modification have also been the focus of manufacturer
sponsored reforms which have recently been statutorily adopted
in several states.8 2
75. II LEGAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 32.
76. See, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115
(1976); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment h (1965).
78. Rogers v. Toro Mfg. Co., 522 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. App. 1975); Noel, Defective Prod-
ucts: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25
VAND. L. REV. 93,96 (1972). Contra, Walker v. Trico Mfg. Co., 487 F.2d 595 (7th
Cir. 1973).
79. See, e.g., Ericksen v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 793, 50 Cal. Rptr.
143 (1966); Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d
471, 403 N.E.2d 167, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980).
80. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 138 N.J. Super, 344, 351 A.2d 22
(App. Div. 1976); Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49
N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d 167, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980); Findley v. Copeland Lum-
ber Co., 265 Or. 300, 509 P.2d 28 (1973).
81. See Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aFd, 474 F.2d 1339
(3d Cir. 1973); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972). Cf. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 n.5 (Utah
1979) (misuse not an affirmative defense unless it exists with a product which
is unreasonably dangerous).
82. See ARiz. REV. STAT. § 12-683 (Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-4(b) (3)
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Courts have had the most difficulty with the affirmative defense
of contributory negligence in strict liability cases. Some courts
have struggled with the theoretical inconsistencies of comparing
fault in cases where a defect in the product, not fault, is supposed
to be the basis of liability.83 Theoretically, if the product is defec-
tive, a claimant's fault should be irrelevant. Arguably this is one
reason contributory negligence was specifically not accepted as a
defense under section 402A of the Restatement.84 Nevertheless,
several courts have accepted contributory negligence as an affirm-
ative defense. 85 This acceptance is consistent with the use of other
doctrines, like assumption of the risk, patently dangerous prod-
ucts, and misuse, which can be viewed as variations of contribu-
tory negligence.86
The same theoretical inconsistencies arise when notions of
comparative fault are applied to strict liability. Nevertheless, an
increasing number of courts have adopted it as a way to get around
the all or nothing approach of the traditional defenses. 87 More
than two-thirds of the states have adopted proportionate responsi-
bility in one form or another, and its use in strict liability is grow-
ing with this trend, both through judicial and statutory adoption.88
The UPLA joins this trend, and incorporates misuse, alteration,
assumption of the risk and contributory negligence 89 into its ver-
sion of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.90 If a claimant unrea-
sonably fails to discover a defect 9 ' or unreasonably uses a known
(Burns Supp. 1979); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.320 (Supp. 1979); OR. REV.
STAT. § 30.915 (1977); R.L GEN. LAWS § 9-1-32 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3708
(Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-5 (1977).
83. See, e.g., Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); Kirkland v. General
Motors, Inc., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965).
85. See, e.g., Stephen v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 N.H. 248, 266 A.2d 855 (1970);
Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622 (1973).
86. See Preston v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1968); Hagenbuck v. Snap-
On Tools Corp., 399 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d
443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
87. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, Beloit Power Sys., Inc., 610 F.2d 149 (3d
Cir. 1979); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380 (1978); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843
(1978).
88. Wade, supra note 8, at 578; see, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, Beloit Power
Sys., Inc., 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548
S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (1979); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1980); MxcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2949 (Supp. 1979).
89. UPLA §§ 111, 112, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,734-37.
90. Reprinted in 12 U.L.A. 33 (Supp. 1979). "Section 111 borrows extensively
from the UCFA and its accompanying commentary." UPLA § 111, Analysis,
reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,737.
91. UPIA § 122(A), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,737. The Act follows the Re-
statement in not requiring the claimant to inspect the product for a defective
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defective product,92 the claimant's recovery is reduced by the per-
centage of the claimant's responsibility for the injury. Proof of a
claimant's misuse or alteration of a product can result in either a
reduction of the plaintiff's recovery by the percentage of his or her
fault, or a determination that the product was not defective. 93 It is
unclear why the drafters decided to retain these traditional catego-
ries while adopting comparative fault. Indeed, many of the techni-
calities involved in the traditional use of these doctrines, which
have led to unnecessary confusion, could have been eliminated by
a comprehensive comparative fault category.9 4 It is also unclear
why the drafters of the UPLA included a misuse and alteration re-
buttal of defect or causation in with the reduction of recovery for
the claimant's fault. Although misuse and alteration are still bars
to recovery, their inclusion in this section shifts the traditional
burden of proof from plaintiff to defendant.9 5 This shift deviates
from common law and creates a confusing inconsistency. Section
104 of the Act requires the claimant to show "by a preponderance
of the evidence that the harm was proximately caused because the
product was defective, '96 while section 112 requires the defendant
to carry the same burden of proof.97 Thus, inclusion here will lead
to much confusion as courts try to interpret which party is to carry
the burden of persuasion. Moreover, the inclusion of the misuse
and alteration rebuttal here is likely to result in increases in the
number of awards as juries avoid difficult decisions on defect and
causation questions by recasting them on fault apportionment
condition. However, if the claimant uses a product with a defective condition
that would have been apparent without inspection to an ordinary reasonably
prudent person, the damages are subject to reduction. Id. For a telling criti-
cism of this apparently inconsistent section, see Twerski & Weinstein, supra
note 13, at 249-50.
92. UPLA § 112(B), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,736-37. In optional subsection
(B) (2), unreasonable use or storage by a third party user which causes the
claimant's harm can also subject the claimant's damages to apportionment.
This section is made optional because of the possibility that the claimant
might be left without anyone to sue. Thus, safety incentives take a back seat
to claimant compensation. See id. § 112(B), Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed.
Reg. at 62,738.
93. Id. § 112(C), (D), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,737.
94. II LEGAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 88-123.
95. Since misuse and product alteration are not affirmative defenses under com-
mon law, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that it was the defect in the
product, not the misuse or alteration, which caused the injury. W. PRossER,
supra note 20, § 102.
96. UPLA §§ 104, 112, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721, 62,736.
97. See UPLA § 112(C), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,736. Section 112(C) (2)
states: "When the product seller proves, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that product misuse by a claimant ... has caused the claimant's harm...




grounds. 98 This categorization undermines the Act's goals of
avoiding confusion and helping to stabilize recoveries, and is un-
necessary to the adoption of comparative fault. Legislatures
should consider an alternate approach to the Act's comparative
fault provisions if they choose to adopt the Act.
The same confusion as to burden of proof arises as a result of
the Act's treatment of the defense of custom. Section 107(C) of the
Act states that custom can be considered by the trier of fact in
judging design and warning defects. 99 Section 107(E) states that if
"the product seller proves, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that it was not within practical technological feasibility to make
the product safer with respect to design and warnings or instruc-
tions," the product seller shall not be liable.10 0 However, in section
104 the Act states that "the claimant has the burden of showing, in
light of the formula, that the product was unreasonably unsafe in
design."''1 Part of the formula includes the technological and
practical feasibility of making the product safer.10 2 The claimant
has the same burden of proof regarding warnings.103 Both parties,
of course, cannot have the same burden of persuasion. A well
drafted act would not contain such inconsistencies.
The Act's treatment of compliance with established industry
standards for design and warning defects follows the law in most
jurisdictions, which looks upon such compliance as just one of the
factors to be considered in determining liability. 0 4 In following
the common law, the UPLA rejects an innovative and useful
change which was included in the draft of the Act. 0 5 Manufactur-
ers have strongly argued that compliance with industry custom
should be a defense; that industry custom is likely to incorporate
all cost-justified safety features; and that products conforming to
these customs are not defective.106 Although manufacturers have
98. See Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 13, at 247-48.
99. UPLA § 107(C), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,728.
100. Id. § 107(E), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,728-29.
101. Id. § 104(B), Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,723. It is clear that the
drafters did not mean the burden of producing evidence. Instead they were
speaking of the burden of persuasion: "If the case is sent to the jury, the
balancing formula should be placed in a jury instruction indicating that the
claimant has the burden of showing, in light of the formula, that the product
was unreasonably unsafe in design." Id.
102. Id. § 104(B) (2) (b), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721.
103. Id. § 104(C) (2) (c), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721.
104. Id. § 107(B), (C), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,728. See text accompanying
note 23 upra.
105. See DRAFr UNIFoRM PRODUCT LTAnn.rry LAw [hereinafter cited as DRAFT], re-
printed in 44 Fed. Reg. 2996 (1979).
106. UPIA § 107, Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,729.
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been able to get a few legislatures to accept this argument,107
courts have almost universally rejected industry custom as a de-
fense.10 8
Initially, the drafters of the UPLA adopted a position between
these points of view, and in the Draft of the Act proposed that com-
pliance with a non-governmental safety standard could raise a re-
buttable presumption of nondefectiveness. The seller could
petition the court to determine whether the standard was strict
enough according to enumerated factors, such as the extent of
product testing and safety evaluation, and the extent consumer in-
terests were considered.109 If the court determined that it was,
then the trier of fact would be instructed to presume nondefective-
ness."10
The drafters eliminated the presumption because of the "vari-
ance in the nature and quality of privately developed safety stan-
dards." ' However, since the court was to screen the standards
according to carefully delineated guidelines, these variations could
have been adequately curbed." 2 Furthermore, adoption of the
presumption might have given manufacturing or other groups
greater incentive to devise standards that set a high level of safety
rather than to encourage individual development of standards at a
107. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310 (Supp. 1980) (rebuttable presumption
of nondefectiveness); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23.3705 (Supp. 1979). Several legal
writers also have supported compliance with industry custom as a defense.
See Wade, supra note 8, at 568 n.85.
108. II LEGAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 340. See note 23 & accompanying text supra.
But see Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich. App. 74, 286 N.W.2d 291
(1978).
109. UPLA § 104(e) states:
A product seller may by a motion request the court to determine
whether the injury-causing aspect of the product conformed to a non-
governmental safety standard having the following characteristics:
(1) It was developed through careful, thorough product testing
and a formal product safety evaluation;
(2) Consumer as well as manufacturer interests were consid-
ered in formulating the standard;
(3) It was considered more than a minimum safety standard at
the time of its development; and
(4) The standard was up-to-date in light of the technological and
scientific knowledge reasonably available at the time the product
was manufactured. If the court makes such a determination in the
affirmative, it shall instruct the trier of fact to presume that the prod-
uct was not defective.
This presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evi-
dence that in light of the factors set forth in Sections 104(B) and (C),
the product was defective.
UPLA § 104(e), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721.
110. DRmrr § 106(e) (1)-(4), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 2999.
111. UPLA § 107(C), Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,730.
112. See DRAr § 106(e) (1)-(4), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 2999.
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greater cost and with more variation in the safety level. Also, liti-
gation costs would be decreased because each standard would not
have to be judged in every case,11 3 and the battle of the experts
would not retain as central an importance at trial." 4 Finally, its
adoption could have helped stabilize insurance rates because in-
surers could assess the development and quality of these stan-
dards and make predictions with more assurance. Thus, the
presumption appears to be consistent with the goals of safety, cost
reduction and rate stabilization, and should be given further con-
sideration.
Compliance with legislative or administrative standards was
given similar treatment in the Draft," 5 but the rebuttable pre-
sumption was retained in the final version.11 6 This is in line with
the position of most courts, which view governmentally deter-
mined standards as minimum safety standards which must be
met. However, compliance with such standards is treated as
strong evidence of nondefectiveness." 7 This presumption is also
supported by the Restatement"8 and by reform legislation in a few
states." 9 Only compliance with mandatory government contract
regulations affords an absolute defense. 120
113. See IV LEGAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 130.
114. Id. at 154-56. The UPLA deals with the problem of biased or unqualified ex-
perts, and the inability of lay jurors to assess their information in section 117
which provides for appointment of expert witnesses by the court. This ap-
pointment can be made known to the jury. UPLA § 117(C), reprinted in 44
Fed. Reg. at 62,745.
115. DRAFT § 107, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 2999.
116. UPLA § 108 (A), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,730. If the injury-causing aspect
was not in compliance, a rebuttable presumption of defect is raised. Id.
§ 108(B), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,730.
117. See Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 77 Ill. 2d 434, 396 N.E.2d 534 (1979); Jones v.
Hittle Serv., Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d 1383 (1976); cf. Sindell v. Abbot Labo-
ratories, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 63 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980) (the court
rejected holding the manufacturers liable under the theory they had acted in
concert because of the government's pervasive role in formulating criteria for
testing and marketing drugs). But see Grye v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 48
U.S.L.W. 2833 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1980) (not only did compliance with Flammable
Fabrics Act not insulate the manufacturer from liability, it also did not insu-
late it from a $1,000,000 punitive damages award).
118. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C, Comment a (1965).
119. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(1) (b) (Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 23-3704 (Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (1977).
120. UPLA § 108(C), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,731. Noncompliance with
mandatory government contract specifications means the product was defec-
tive. Id. § 108(D), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,730. This section protects the
manufacturer from a "Catch-22" situation. The government is the appropri-
ate defendant in such situations, and the drafters admonish the legislature to
make sure adequate compensation is provided for under state law. Id.
§ 108(C), Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,731.
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The drafters adopted another rebuttable presumption of
nondefectiveness-that a product over ten years old is beyond its
useful safe life.12 1 Despite the fact that liability claims for old
products make up a very small percentage of product liability
claims,122 insurers cited them as one of the main factors underly-
ing their inability to predict liability and hold down rates. 123 Man-
ufacturers were equally upset by the thought of liability for a
product which had passed from their control 20 or 30 years previ-
ously. Consequently, insurer and manufacturer lobbying efforts
have resulted in the adoption of statutes of repose in over one-
third of the states. 124 In most of these states the statute is an abso-
lute bar to liability 125 for a product which has been in the hands of
the consumer 12 6 for a stated period of time-usually ten years.127
Statutes of repose differ from the usual statutes of limitation
because they are based on the product itself, not on the cause of
action. They are passed to protect special interests, not to ensure
the timely prosecution of rights.128 Similar special legislation for
architects and builders has been challenged on equal protection
and due process grounds, as well as under state constitutional pro-
visions, with mixed success.129 Challenges to the product-related
121. Id. § 110(B), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,732.
122. The 1976 Products Liability Closed Claim Survey (Insurance Services Office,
New York City (Dec. 1976)) reported that products over six years old made
up only 2.7% of the litigated claims.
123. DRAFT § 106(e), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 3009; INSURANCE STUDY, supra
note 2, at 4-92.
124. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (Supp. 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-
403(3) (Supp. 1978); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a (West Supp. 1978); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 95.831(2) (West Supp. 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106 (Supp.
1980); ILL. ANN. REV. STAT. ch.28, § 22.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-4-20A-5 (Burns Supp. 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310 (Supp.
1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-724 (Reissue 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905 (1977);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-13 (1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp.
1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3703 (Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3(1)
(1977). In addition, North Carolina's statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B (1979),
could be interpreted as a statute of repose. See Note, supra note 3, at 707-08.
125. But see COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(3) (Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 411.310 (Supp. 1980). These statutes raise rebuttable presumptions of
nondefectiveness after the running of the statutory period.
126. Some states measure the repose period from the time of manufacture. See,
e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310 (Supp. 1980) (five years from date of sale to
consumer or eight years from date of manufacture); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-13
(1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3(1) (1977) (six years from sale to consumer
or ten years from date of manufacture).
127. The periods range from a low of five years (Kentucky) to a high of 12 years
(Arizona and Florida). At least 8 states (Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Indi-
ana, Nebraska, Tennessee, Rhode Island and Utah) have adopted the 10-year
state of repose.
128. V LEGAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 7.
129. Over half of the states have enacted repose statutes for architects and build-
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statutes of repose are even less likely to be successful because,
unlike architect and builder statutes, the product liability statutes
of repose do not distinguish between classes of defendants.130
Despite the strong legislative support, statutes of repose were
rejected by the drafters of the UPLA because "they may deprive a
person... of the right to bring a claim based on a defective prod-
uct before the injury has actually occurred.' 31 Instead, they sub-
stituted a rebuttable presumption that after ten years a product is
beyond its useful safe life, and increased the burden of proof nec-
essary to overcome this presumption.
132
Exceptions to the presumption's applicability severely weaken
its effectiveness in dealing with older-product problems. The ten-
year presumption does not apply if: (1) the harm was caused by
prolonged exposure to a defective product; (2) the injury-causing
aspect of the product was not reasonably discoverable until after
ten years; or (3) the injury did not manifest itself until after ten
years.133 Furthermore, the presumption does not apply to war-
ranty or intentional misrepresentation cases. 34 Since the few
cases involving older products have almost all involved either capi-
tal goods, where the presumption would be fairly easy to rebut, 35
ers. See V LEGAL STuDY, supra note 2, at 10-11. Only five jurisdictions have
overturned repose statutes on constitutional grounds. Alabama and Ken-
tucky overturned their statutes on state constitutional grounds. Bagby Ele-
vator & Elec. Co. v. McBride, 292 Ala. 191, 291 So.2d 306 (1974); Saylor v. Hall,
497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973). Hawaii, Illinois and Wisconsin overturned them on
equal protection grounds. Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973);
Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2.1 588 (1967); Millwork Corp. v.
Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (:975).
130. Cf. Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967) (statute invali-
dated on grounds that, under state constitution, legislature cannot grant spe-
cial privilege, immunity or franchise to any person, corporation or
association); see V LEGAL STuDY, supra note 2, at 10. But see Massery, Date-
of-Sale Statutes of Limitations-a New Immunity for Product Suppliers, 1977
INs. L.J. 535, 545.
131. UPLA § 110, Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,733.
132. Id. § 110(B) (1), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,732. "In claims that involve
harm caused more than ten (10) years after time of delivery, a presumption
arises that the harm was caused after the useful safe life had expired. This
presumption may only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence." Id.
133. Id. § 110(B) (2) (d), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,732.
134. Id. § 110(B) (2), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,732.
135. See, e.g., Pryor v. Lee C. Moore Corp., 262 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1959) (liability
for the collapse of a 15-year-old crane where the evidence showed that a prop-
erly fused weld would have lasted more than 15 years); Miller v. Bock Laun-
dry Mach. Co., 568 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1977) (liability for failure of an 18-year-old
laundry machine seal where the evidence was that the normal life expec-
tancy was 30 to 40 years); Kozlawski v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 87 Wis. 2d
882, 275 N.W.2d 915 (1979) (19-year-old sausage-stuffing machine). See V LE-
GAL STuDY, supra note 2, at 4-5.
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or the types of injuries or actions which are excluded from the pre-
sumption's protection, 13 6 this presumption is likely to be of little
practical value.
Moreover, the costs associated with the use of this presumption
make it even less appealing. The manufacturer would be required
to prove the product has met the ten-year requirement in order to
take advantage of the presumption. The ten-year period begins to
run at the time of delivery to the first purchaser or lessee not en-
gaged in selling the product or in using it as a component part.137
In the case of goods delivered close to the ten-year period, it would
be virtually impossible to show the date of delivery unless the re-
tailer or manufacturer keeps relatively detailed sales and inven-
tory records. Yet the expense and bother of keeping such records
for ten years will probably outweigh their utility for these close
cases; consequently, they will not be kept. Thus, manufacturers
will not find the presumption very useful except in cases where the
product was clearly delivered more than ten years prior to the in-
jury. Essentially, adoption of this presumption would remove the
special statutory protection accorded manufacturers in many
states, 13 8 but it would not materially increase a plaintiff's current
burden of overcoming a jury's natural skepticism about a product
being defective when it has been in continuous use without inci-
dent for over 10 years.
In those cases in which the presumption does not apply, be-
cause ten years have not elapsed, the ten-year lapse cannot be
proved, or because one of the exceptions applies, a useful safe life
defense is still available to the manufacturer. However, in these
cases the manufacturer has the burden of proving the product was
being used beyond its useful safe life.139 Factors considered ex-
pecially probative in determining the useful safe life are the
amount of wear and tear, the storage conditions, and the use of the
product compared to normal use by others. 4 0 These, of course, are
nothing more than the factors upon which any good defense coun-
sel usually would rely to show that the product was not defective
or that it was misused. A final consideration, manufacturer repre-
sentations, instructions or warnings regarding useful safe life may
136. Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., Nat'l Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1974)
(pollution); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co. 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979) (di-
ethylstilbestrol); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969)
(plastic on gearshift lever deteriorated after 12 months of sunlight exposure
but accident causing impalement due to shattering of plastic occurred 13
years after manufacture).
137. UPLA § 110(A) (1), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,733.
138. See note 125 & accompanying text supra.
139. UPLA § 110(A) (1), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,732.
140. Id. § 110(A) (1) (a), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,732.
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be used to support a useful safe life defense; however, these fac-
tors are considered probative only if not too self-serving.141
Although the drafters considered manufacturer abuse of safe
life warnings and instructions, they failed to consider its oppo-
site--consumer manipulation of safe life into a new theory of lia-
bility. Thus, the useful safe life defense may be a double-edged
sword for the manufacturer. If manufacturers have sufficient in-
formation to show that a product is being used beyond its useful
safe life, does this information then raise a duty on the part of the
manufacturer to warn all users as to the useful safe life period?
Such a duty would be consistent with both the Act and case law.
The Act makes a failure to warn or properly instruct about a
product's use a cause of action.142 This cause of action specifically
includes a failure to warn based on post-production knowledge. 143
Increasingly, manufacturers have been held liable for failures to
warn even where the likelihood of harm is extremely small.144 The
manufacturer is the body most likely to have and be able to gather
information about useful safe life, both through actual damage re-
ports, and through engineering and design projections. 145 There-
fore, when a duty of common sense use by consumers is balanced
against a duty to warn on the part of the manufacturer, the manu-
facturer's superior knowledge would probably weigh heavily in
favor of placing the duty on the manufacturer. Such a duty would
also be consistent with the current pro-consumer bias in product
liability law, and with the safety goals underlying strict liability.
Once such a duty is generally recognized, its limitations are
hard to imagine. If the useful safe life seems short in a regard to
some expectations, warnings, recall or even redesign might be re-
quired. Furthermore, punitive damages may be available for a fail-
ure to act on accumulated safe life information. 146 Liability for
141. Id. § 110(A) (1) (d), Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,733-34. The prod-
uct seller cannot use the safe life warnings or instructions to set unreason-
ably short periods of time or unreasonable instructions regarding care to
limit its liabilty. Id. Contra, Valez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d
117, 305 N.E.2d 750, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1973).
142. UPLA § 104(C), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721.
143. Id. § 104(C) (6), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721.
144. See, e.g., Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S., 577 F.2d 968 (5th
Cir. 1978); Graham v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, 8 P.S.L.R. 415 (DeL Super. Ct.
1980); Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 87 Wis. 2d 882, 275 N.W.2d 915
(1979); Moran v. Fabergd, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975).
145. Cf. Graham v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, 8 P.S.L.R. 415 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980)
(20 reports to manufacturer of injury put duty on manufacturer to warn ex-
pert). See UPLA § 104(C) (6), Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,725.
146. The duty to warn regarding the expected life of products has been mentioned
by commentators, e.g., Wade, supra note 28, at 848; Phillips, supra note 50, at
358, but has generally not been accepted by the courts. But see Cronin v.
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selling replacement parts or for encouraging a resale market is
also possible if such activities would contribute to a product being
used beyond its useful safe life.147 Conceivably, the dating of all
products, accompanied by warnings as to their useful safe life, may
be required. Needless to say, the economic impact of such a re-
quirement would be tremendous. Since suits for old product inju-
ries are relatively rare, and since the effectiveness of the useful life
presumption is questionable, this useful life section should be
eliminated.
The primary motivation for use of a safe life defense and the
useful life presumption was to stabilize insurance rates by placat-
ing manufacturers and insurers who claimed that "open-ended" li-
ability for products was the main cause of the instability. 148
Workplace injuries are a major source of old-product suits and the
stabilization of insurance rates would be better served by the pro-
visions dealing with workplace accidents than by the useful safe
life provisions. While the drafters of the UPLA did not feel it was
within their province to change worker's compensation or the tort
compensation system, they did devise a plan which more equitably
distributes the cost of workplace accidents within the present
framework.149 Following a plan proposed by the American Insur-
ance Association, 5 0 the UPLA reduces the liability of the manufac-
J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972) (duty
to warn regarding the length of time a bread truck could be safely used);
Hamilton v. Motor Coach Indus., Inc., 569 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978)
(duty to warn of a nondefective product which may change (rust) with the
passage of time). A discussion of using disclaimers to solve the problem of
older products, something which can be done without legislative change, is
included in V LEGAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 25-29. The Act's useful safe life
section is likely to make expected life warning generally required.
147. See Phillips, supra note 50, at 358.
148. Perhaps more significant than any other single factor alleged to
be the cause of the nationwide product liability insurance problem
are the rules governing the responsibility of product sellers for older
products .... In the case of sellers of durable goods. . ., an "open-
ended" liability situation is created. Section 110 attempts to provide
insurers and product sellers with some security against stale claims,
while preserving the claimant's right to obtain damages for injuries
caused by defective products.
UPLA § 110, Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,733.
149. Id. § 114, Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,740. In many states, manu-
facturers of workplace products must pay for all out-of-pocket expenses and
all the pain and suffering awards of the claimant because of manufacturer
has no claim for contribution against a negligent employer. E.g., Seaboard
Coast Line R.R. v. Smith, 359 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1978). Contra, Skinner v. Reed-
Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 70 111. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977); Dole v.
Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 311 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).




turer by the amount of worker compensation benefits received or
to be received by the claimant.151 Moreover, employer misuse or
improper alteration of the product reduces the claimant-em-
ployee's award, which in turn reduces the manufacturer's liabil-
ity.'5 2 These sections make it unlikely that a manufacturer will
pay more than is apportionable to its fault in workplace injuries,
including injuries caused by old prGducts. Since workplace inju-
ries are a major source of old-product suits, 153 these provisions
make the rebuttable presumption of a ten year safe life even less
necessary.
IV. LIMITATIONS ON DAMAGES AND TRIALS
The Act's proposals to help curb awards are its most novel and
least effectual. The limitation on non-pecuniary damages is a good
example. An optional subsection suggests that the state should
limit non-pecuniary damages to $25,000 or twice the pecuniary
damages, whichever is less. 154 Such a limitation faces serious con-
stitutional challenges similar to those raised by the statutes of re-
pose.155 They may violate due process or equal protection clauses,
or prohibitions on damage limitations in some state constitutions.
Similar provisions in automobile no-fault and medical malpractice
legislation have encountered difficulties. 156
However, even if the limitation survives these challenges it will
be of little help in closing the "openendedness" of pain and suffer-
ing awards 15 7 because the limitation does not apply to non-pecuni-
151. UPLA § 114(A), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,740. Transaction costs are re-
duced under this plan by barring employer subrogation, contribution or in-
demnity against the product seller. Id. Also, the employer's worker
compensation insurance carrier has no right of subrogation. Id. § 114(B), re-
printed in Fed. Reg. at 62,741.
152. Id. § 112(C), (D), reprinted in Fed. Reg. at 62,737. This plan gives the em-
ployer stronger incentive to maintain products and provide a safe workplace
than is provided under the current laws. See I LEGAL STuDy, supra note 2,
at 121.
153. A large number of old product suits involve capital goods which are being
used in a workplace situation. See Note, supra note 3, at 702; note 135 & ac-
companying text supra.
154. UPLA § 118(C), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,747. Section 118 defines non-
pecuniary damages as "those which have no market value and do not repre-
sent a monetary loss to claimant." Id. § 118(A), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at
62,747. The rest of Section 118 merely states that the court shall review dam-
age awards for excessiveness. Id. § 118(B), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,
747.
155. See note 129 & accompanying text supra.
156. See UPLA § 118, Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,747 (listing cases and
statutes); V LEGAL STuDY, supra note 2, at 109.
157. "A most important reason for the difficulty in setting product liability rates is
the 'openendedness' of damages for pain and suffering." UPLA § 118, Analy-
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ary damages in cases where the claimant has suffered "permanent
or prolonged (1) disfigurement, (2) impair[ment] of bodily func-
tion, (3) pain and discomfort, or (4) mental illness.' 58 Limiting
non-pecuniary damages in those cases in which they are likely to
be small, but leaving them unchecked in cases where they are
likely to be largest, and where juries' sympathies are most easily
aroused will do little to cure the "openendedness" problem. More-
over, it will increase litigation costs because it will be necessary to
determine whether a harm is serious, permanent or prolonged.
The UPLA's proposed modification of the collateral source rule
would probably have even less effect than the damage limitation
provision in curbing awards, since it applies only to claimants
whose compensation has been paid by general tax revenues such
as Medicaid or Medicare. The provision reduces a claimant's re-
covery by the amount received for the injuries from a fund which
gets more than half of its revenue from general taxes.'5 9 The ethi-
cal concerns about limiting the collateral source rule only to the
disadvantage of the poor are obvious. Thus, because the amount
deductible from an award would be so inconsequential (20% of the
amount awarded in 6% of the claims),160 and because the rule only
works to the detriment of the disadvantaged, the framers should
have done nothing if they could not take a more comprehensive
approach to the problem.
The most useful UPLA section regarding damages is the one
dealing with punitive damages. Punitive damages, like old-product
claims, have received more publicity and business concern than
are justified by the actual cases. 161 Nevertheless, the potential for
abuse exists, and the Act's treatment of punitive damages may
help to curb these excesses.
The Act continues the policy of having the jury determine
whether punitive damages should be awarded; however, plaintiffs
burden of proof is increased. The claimant must show by clear and
convincing evidence that defendant had a reckless disregard for
sis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,746. According to one study, 70% of claims
closed with payment include non-pecuniary damages, and the greater the pe-
cuniary damages, the greater the average amount of non-pecuniary pay-
ments. Id.
158. Id. § 118(C)(1)-(4), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,746.
159. Id. § 119, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,747. "[Tlhe claimant's recovery, or
that of any party who may be subrogated ... shall be reduced by any com-
pensation from a public source which the claimant has... or will receive for
the same damages. '[Plublic source' means a fund more than half of which is
derived from general tax revenues." Id.
160. Id. § 119, Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,748.
161. Fulton, Punitive Damages in Product Liability Cases, FORUM, Fall 1979, at 117;
see Annot., 29 A.LR.3d 1021 (1968).
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safety.162 This standard is closer to the criminal standard of be-
yond a reasonable doubt, and it is consistent with the semi-crimi-
nal nature of this type of damages. 163 Once the jury decides
punitive damages are merited, the decision-making shifts to the
judge to determine the amount. 64 Since the judge is assumedly
less subject to emotional appeals, and is instructed to follow spe-
cific considerations in making the determination,1 65 extreme
awards should be eliminated.
These considerations generally follow suggested reforms of le-
gal writers166 and are based on Minnesota legislation 167 passed af-
ter thorough consideration of the topic.168
Some of these considerations are the same factors which the
jury is to balance when judging the reasonableness of the manu-
facturer's design or warning decisions. 169 Thus, records of design
or warning choices which do not show a clear preference for safety
could form the basis of punitive damage awards. 170 Although the
162. UPLA, § 120(A), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,748.
163. But see Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV.
870, 885 (1976).
164. UPLA § 120(B), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,748.
165. Id. § 120(B), Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,749.
166. See, e.g., Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Ap-
proach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1980); Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Li-
ability Litigation, 74 MCH. L REv. 1257 (1976); Note, Exemplary Damages in
the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1957).
167. See Mum. STAT. §§ 549.20, 549.21 (Supp. 1980).
168. The UPLA requires the judge to consider:.
(1) the likelihood at the relevant time that serious harm would arise
from the product seller's misconduct; (2) the degree of the product
seller's awareness of that likelihood; (3) the profitability of the mis-
conduct to the product seller; (4) the duration at the misconduct, (5)
whether the product seller attempted to conceal the misconduct; (6)
the product seller's response to the discovery of the misconduct; (7)
whether the product seller has terminated the misconduct; (8) the
product seller's financial condition; (9) the total effect of other pun-
ishment imposed or likely to be imposed on the product seller as a
result of the misconduct; and (10) whether the harm suffered by the
claimant was also the result of the claimant's own reckless disregard
for personal safety.
UPLA § 120(B), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,748.
169. These considerations include: "(1) the likelihood at the relevant time that
serious harm would arise from the product seller's misconduct; (2) the de-
gree of the product seller's awareness of that likelihood; [and] . . . (5) the
attitude and conduct of the product seller upon discovery of the misconduct
and whether the conduct has been terminated." Id.
170. Cf. Strobel & Tybor, Pinto Papers Hold Key to Ford Trial, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 7,
1980, at 1, col. 4 (discussing importance of internal Ford memos, crash tests,
reports and financial studies to Indiana's prosecution of Ford for criminal
recklessness in State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5324 (Pulaski County Ct. 1980));
Buehler v. Whalen, 70 Ill. 2d 51, 374 N.E.2d 460 (1978) (in failure to comply
with discovery request for testing results, the trial court would have been
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Act would increase punitive damage awards in approximately one-
fifth of the states, where they are prohibited or severely limited,171
the Act's scheme could serve as a useful check on juries in states
in which they are currently allowed. 172
Attempts by the UPLA to filter out frivolous claims and unnec-
essary parties are primarily embodied in provisions dealing with
the assignment of costs and attorneys' fees, arbitration, and non-
manufacturing sellers. These provisions are also likely to meet
with mixed success in achieving their goals.
Manufacturers and insurers have blamed part of the increase in
the number of liability claims and in the cost of insurance on the
bringing of frivolous claims which allegedly are partially fostered
by contingency fees. 173 The Act's response, although cosmetically
appealing, is ineffectual. Attorneys' fees and other costs deter-
mined by the judge to be the result of pursuing a frivolous claim or
defense can be assessed against the party pursuing the claim, or
the attorney, or both. 174 The determination is to be made after
final judgment has been entered, and is to be based on a standard
of clear and convincing evidence. "[T] he court must conclude that
the claim was without any reasonable legal or factual basis."'175
However, because virtually anything more than a fraudulent claim
will have some legal merit when judged by this stiffer burden of
proof, especially any claims which survive beyond the pleadings
stage, the frivolous claims provision will cover few, if any, cases.
Furthermore, this provision adds little to the current law, in light
of the remedies that already exist for misuse of the legal proc-
ess.
176
justified in striking defendant's answer and only submitting to the jury the
question of damages).
171. Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington, as well as Puerto Rico,
do not allow punitive damages. Indiana does not allow them if the defend-
ant's conduct is punishable as a crime. Connecticut, Michigan and New
Hampshire limit them to compensation for actual damages. Mallor & Roberts,
supra note 166, at 641 n.8, 643 n.28.
172. See, e.g., Sturm Ruger & Co., Inc. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979) (award of
$2,895,000 punitive damages was remanded as excessive in case where claim-
ant was injured when he grabbed for a gun he had dropped and shot himself
in the leg despite warnings and obviousness of the danger); Grye v. Dayton-
Hudson Corp., 48 U.S.LW. 2833 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1980) ($1,000,000 in punitive
damages awarded against a manufacturer despite the fact that it had com-
plied with the Federal Flammable Fabrics Act of 1953).
173. V LEGAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 79-81; UPLA § 115, Analysis, reprinted in 44
Fed. Reg. at 62,741.
174. UPLA § 115(c), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,741.
175. Id. § 115, Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,742.
176. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (disciplinary action can be taken against an attor-
ney who knowingly signs a false pleading or one with "scandalous or inde-
cent" matter, or who interposes one for delay); FED. R. App. P. 38 ("If a court
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Another effort to fiter out frivolous claims and reduce transac-
tion costs is made through the arbitration section. 177 The section
provides for non-binding arbitration on the motion of either party
before trial if the dispute is for less than $50,000. The arbitration is
to be done by a three-member panel which ifies the arbitration de-
cision and award with the court. 7 8 Within twenty days after filing
either party can demand a trial. However, at trial, evidence that
there was arbitration and the nature and amount of the award are
given to the trier of fact. Also, the party asking for the trial is to be
assessed the cost of the arbitration plus interest on the arbitration
award if the trial results in an award that is less than that party
received or more than it had to pay under arbitration.1 7 9
Transaction costs will only be reduced if few arbitrations go on
to trial. The admissibility of arbitration evidence at trial, combined
with the assessment of costs, should help keep the number of re-
quests for trial low. The $50,000 ceiling should allow a large
number of claims to be submitted to the arbitration process. 180
However, it may also bring about an increase in the amount of
damages claimed as parties try to avoid arbitration. Nevertheless,
this section has the potential for speeding up decisions, and for
having them made on a less emotional basis and at less expense
than through litigation.
Litigation expenses should also be reduced by the UPLA's
exclusion of non-manufacturers from liability unless their actions
directly led to a claimant's injury. Wholesalers, retailers and dis-
tributors are routinely included in the product liability suit,
of appeals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just dam-
ages and single or double costs to the appellee."). In addition, a wronged
party could bring suit for abuse of process. W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 121.
177. UPIA § 116, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,742.
178. UPLA § 116(A), (C), (H), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,742. Unless the par-
ties agree otherwise, the arbitration is to be conducted by an active state bar
member or a retired judge of a state court of record, a person with expertise
in the field in dispute, and a layperson. Id.
Compulsory, non-binding arbitration in medical malpractice disputes has
met with mixed success when challenged, as have the medico-legal review
panels. See VI LEGAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 154-63. Recently, in Aldana v.
Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980), the Florida medical malpractice statute was
held unconstitutional because its absolute jurisdictional time periods de-
prived the physicians in the case of due process. Section 116 should be unaf-
fected by the Aldana decision since the UPLA provides for arbitration within
30 days after the claim is referred unless the court extends the period for
good cause shown.
179. UPLA § 116(H) (1), (3)-(4), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,742.
180. Insurance data indicates that the average payment in bodily injury cases,
trended for severity, is $26,004, and that more than two-thirds of product lia-




thereby increasing both defense costs and insurance premiums;
yet these defendants account for a very small percentage of claims
paid.18 1 Under the Act, causes of action against non-manufactur-
ers will not be submitted to the jury unless the claimant has pro-
duced sufficient evidence to support a finding that the non-
manufacturer's own negligence led to the claimant's injuries, or
that the non-manufacturer breached an express warranty.182 This
provision is consistent with the Act's general fault approach to lia-
bility; the use of non-manufacturer sellers as back-up insurers for
manufacturer's is not. Nevertheless, the Act subjects a product
seller to liability, regardless of its fault, if the manufacturer is not
subject to service of process, is insolvent, or is likely to be judg-
ment proof.183 This extension of strict liability to non-manufactur-
ers, while consistent with common law, exhibits an extreme
preference for consumer compensation uncharacteristic of the rest
of the UPLA. No cogent reason is given why the consumer should
be preferred over wholesalers, retailers and distributors once strict
liability as a comprehensive approach to product liability has been
abandoned. Arguably, non-manufacturers should be judged by the
same fault standards as manufacturers and consumers.
V. CONCLUSION
The Model Uniform Product Liability Act was proposed to en-
sure the availability of product liability insurance, to reduce litiga-
tion costs, and to eliminate confusion while ensuring reasonable
compensation for injured claimants and fostering safety. The Act
will meet with mixed success in accomplishing these goals.
The retention of a strict liability approach for manufacturing
defects and a negligence approach for design and warning defects
should help foster these goals. This approach ensures compensa-
tion to consumers for injuries resulting from accidentally mis-
manufactured products in cases in which negligence would be
virtually impossible to prove. Furthermore, it does so without en-
couraging soaring insurance premiums, because the incidence of
mismanufactured products is relatively predictable and, therefore,
can be more readily insured. Since there is no confusion as to the
standard by which to judge the product, judges and juries will con-
tinue to find it workable.
A risk-benefit approach to design and warning defects should
help clear up confusion regarding an appropriate standard, and is
181. Distributors, wholesalers, and retailers accounted for 4.6% of total product
liability payments according to a 1977 Insurance Service Office Closed Claims
Survey. UPLA § 105, Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,727.
182. Id. § 105(A)-(B), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,726.
183. Id. § 105(C), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,726.
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more workable than the consumer expectations test. Juries can
more readily balance the factors involved in making a design or
adequacy of a warning choice with less difficulty than that involved
in discerning what the average person would know about or expect
from a complicated product. Furthermore, a risk-benefit approach
should promote the primary goal of product liability safety. Manu-
facturers should use greater care in considering design and warn-
ing alternatives when careful, well documented decisions can
make a difference as to their liability. At the same time, insurers
should be able to assess the quality of these decisions and more
realistically predict the potential liability flowing from them. Pre-
miums could be lowered for the careful manufacturer, who would
no longer have to pay for the careless. Furthermore, as a result of
the potential incentives of reduced premiums and reduced liabil-
ity, manufacturers should give safety more consideration in their
decision-making. Greater economy and safety would be promoted
by the use of a rebuttable presumption of nondefectiveness for
compliance with carefully drawn industry standards in which
safety was duly featured. Although not contained in the UPLA,
such a presumption should be given further consideration.
Although the burden of proving manufacturer knowledge is re-
turned to the plaintiff under the Act's negligence approach, this
provision is not essential to the adoption of a risk-benefit standard,
and could be ignored by courts and legislatures desiring to con-
tinue the evidentiary preference for the consumer. Nevertheless,
the impact of the UPLA's shift in the burden should be minimized
by today's negligence standard which considers the manufacturer
to be an expert in its field. The Act's judgment of knowledge and
feasibility at the time of manufacture is the appropriate standard if
manufacturers are not to be insurers of their products.
The adoption of comparative fault in the UPLA may aid in
achieving most of the Act's goals if some changes are made in the
Act's provisions. Comparative fault is theoretically consistent with
the primary goal of safety because making users responsible for
their misuse or abuse of a product should make them more careful.
While product users' decisions are probably less affected by the
legal consequences than are manufacturers', there may be some
increase in safety consciousness which strict liability does not
seem to have promoted. The abandonment of the all-or-nothing
approach, characteristic of negligence and contributory negligence
law, redounds to the benefit of both consumers and manufacturers
through a fairer allocation of responsibility and payments, and the
reduction of insurance premiums and product prices which should
result. However, the old negligence defense categories should be
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abandoned to eliminate unnecessary confusion and reduce litiga-
tion costs.
Similarly, the UPLA's useful safe life defense and rebuttable
presumption should be eliminated. Statutes of repose are the
most effective way to solve the openendedness problem related to
old products. If such a statute is not retained, the Act's compro-
mise safe life solution should not be adopted. It raises the spectre
of increased costs, confusion and liability which is antithetical to
the Act's goals. Abandonment of the Act's compromise safe life
proposals would be adequately compensated for by the setting off
of worker-compensation payments and third-party liability for mis-
use and alteration. Furthermore, comparative fault provides some
protection for a manufacturer since the older the product is, the
harder it would be for a claimant to show reasonable use or defect.
At a minimum, the burden of proof inconsistencies raised by the
Act's treatment of defenses needs to be resolved.
As analysis of the 'safe life compromise solution indicates, the
Act's attempts at solving the openendedness problems are the
least effective part of the Act because the proposals are so hedged
with compromises. The non-pecuniary damage limitation, modifi-
cation of the collateral source rule and the assessment of costs are
more likely to increase litigation costs and cause additional confu-
sion than they are to have a positive effect, and should not be
adopted. The arbitration and punitive damages sections, however,
deserve careful consideration.
The Act's attempt to solve the perceived crisis in product liabil-
ity law should be carefully considered by the courts and legisla-
tures. Not all of its solutions should be adopted, nor should
attempts at solving the problems through the adjudicative process
be abandoned without serious thought. Nevertheless, the Act
should serve as a valuable resource tool to those searching for so-
lutions.
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